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Introduction 
 
The study of strategy is a recent phenomenon. Apart from early attempts on describing 
strategy in terms of how to conduct wars and subtle diplomacy, strategy as a theoreti-
cal and practical concept did not occur within business administration theory until the 
middle of the twentieth century. Since then, a plethora of concepts and management 
recipes has evolved. To some extent, the proliferation of concepts and ideas reflects 
that strategy as a scholarly activity is still in its infancy. 
Based on a theoretical overview and empirical observations, the paper discusses a 
variety of concepts of strategy. The main argument is that even though the concepts of 
strategy mostly reflect the perception of science at the macro-sociological level, the 
research field of strategy seems keen on mixing paradigms. The paper arrives at the 
argument that contemporary scholarly activities may benefit from viewing strategy as 
a dialectical phenomenon in terms of a continuous transposition of managerial deci-
sion making situations. 
A brief review of theories on strategy in terms of a variety of major schools leads 
to the conclusion that we need to pay more attention to organisational practice. In con-
sequence, the theoretical concepts are contrasted with the every-day experiences of six 
managers of small and medium-sized Danish private business firms that have volun-
teered in discussion with researchers on telling stories about how strategy appears and 
evolves in the every-day life of the firms in question. The strategy story-telling shows 
that strategy making, both as a phenomenon of management design and as a phe-
nomenon of leadership of organisational learning, is competing with other managerial 
activities about time and other limited managerial resources. In consequence, this is 
actually what constitutes the importance of the dialectical nature of strategic proc-
esses. 
The final argument of the paper is that the state of dichotomisation does not in-
volve mutual exclusiveness of different types of strategy activities, but rather involves 
a diversity of strategy processes that take place simultaneously. Similarly, different 
lines of thought need not be mutually exclusive, but may actually facilitate the under-
standing of strategy when combined into a dialectical framework. 
 
 
A dichotomy of strategy worldviews 
 
Strategy is a relatively simple concept from the point of view of classic orthodox eco-
nomics. The firm comprises one decision-making unit, and decisions are mainly based 
on how external price signals at the market place meet internal decreasing returns to 
scale. Information is readily available (or distributed evenly) and opportunities for 
growth appear as exogenous stimuli or as endogenous abilities that by and large are 
distributed evenly. 
 This is, of course, a very simplified picture and it is not really shared by mainstream 
economics anymore. Issues like internal and external economies, information asym-
metries, multiple decision-making units and vested interests have been introduced in a 
setting where market power and increasing returns to scale prevail (e.g. such diverse 
contributions as Alchian & Demsetz, 1972, Williamson, 1964, 1975, 1985, and 
Richardson, 1960, 1972). However, to some extent the issue of how and why deci-
sions are made is still a question of striking a balance, i.e. finding some sort of equilib-
rium state of contractual or co-ordinate relationships – of course characterised by im-
perfections and being unstable and dynamic, but nevertheless still a type of equilibrat-
ing phenomenon. 
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 Adverse economists have tried to create an alternative to the story of equilibrating 
mechanisms. A strand of theoretical thinking of increasing importance is the resource-
based theory of the firm that explains divergence from equilibrium towards sustain-
able competitive advantages by phenomena like experience-based managerial re-
sources (Penrose, 1959), organisational cultures that are rare and can’t be imitated 
(Barney, 1986), invisible assets such as product reputations (Itami, 1987) and prevail-
ing heuristics for solving problems (Schoemaker, 1990). As explained by Knudsen 
(1996:28), this line of thinking is characterised by an attempt to identify isolating 
mechanisms (Rumelt, 1984), i.e. firm-specific characteristics that makes the firm 
unique and powerful at the market place, and is to an increasing degree contributing to 
the development of the capability-based theory of the firm (Wernerfeldt, 1984) 
according to which divergence from equilibrium is caused by cumulative historical 
processes. 
 The main characteristic unifying these theories is that they conceive the firm as a 
system comprising interrelated entities that together create some sort of synergy and 
irreversibility. They are part of the theoretical development that diverts from the pic-
ture of the economic man and reverts to the concept of the administrative man (Simon, 
1957), also associated with the seminal work on Organizations by March & Simon 
(1958). The main feature of this line of thinking is that organisational behaviour can 
be described in terms of archetypes in the Weberian sense (as exemplified by his no-
tion of bureaucratic behaviour, Weber, 1922), e.g. as the development of organisa-
tional routines (Cyert & March, 1963), the formation of specific competitive behav-
iours (Miles & Snow, 1978, 1986, Gjerding, 1998), or the recipe for growth-oriented 
behaviour associated with change (Peters & Waterman, 1982, Kanter, 1983), learning 
(Pedler, Boydell & Burgoyne, 1989, Pedler, Burgoyne & Boydell, 1991) or flexibility 
(Gjerding, 1996, 2003, Volberda, 1998). 
 Furthermore, the view on organisations shared by these attempts, although not ex-
plicitly stated by most of them, is what Scott (2003) defines as the rational perspective 
as opposed to a natural perspective. According to the rational perspective, organisa-
tional action reflects intention, which in many cases is explicitly directed towards 
achieving explicit goals. Rationality may be the outcome of deliberate uni-directional 
planning, internal political struggle, or the balance between different types of rational-
ity within the organisation, but it is nevertheless rational in the sense that intention 
prevails although executing intention may be directed by hindsight and limited by the 
impossibility of foresight (as in the case of satisficing behaviour, Cyert & March, 
1963). 
 Alternatively, according to the natural perspective strategy is something that occurs 
as the result of organisational and social processes, or strategy can even be the process 
itself. Of course, intention is still important since people act for some reason, but in-
tention is not at the hart of the analysis. Instead, it is the processes and the events that 
occur within the organisation and during the interplay between the organisation and its 
environment that occupy the mind of the theorist. What becomes interesting as phe-
nomena characterising the creation and shaping of strategy are processes of enactment 
(Weick, 1979), emergent properties of the organisation (Mintzberg, 1994), processes 
of strategy-making that occurs alongside planning-oriented activities (Mintzberg et al., 
1998), strategic leadership and communication of mind-sets rather than strategic plan-
ning (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, Hitt et al., 2005), and continuos reorientation of the 
organisational mindset (Ghoshall & Bartlett, 1999) associated with generative thinking 
(Witt & Meyer, 1998). 
 The distinction between the rational and the natural approach to strategy may be 
traced back to the dichotomy of grand sociological theories, i.e. the distinction be-
tween a functional approach and a phenomenological approach, as exemplified by the 
Weberian distinction between “erklärendes Verstehen” and “aktuelles Verstehen” 
Page 4 of 15 
(Weber, 1922). While the rational approach is based on the assumption that phenom-
ena can be understood and explained in terms of their contribution to e.g. the common 
goal or the function of an entity, the natural approach is based on the assumption that 
phenomena occur as part of the everyday construction of common understandings and 
social behaviour. 
Planning occur in both cases, of course, but while planning in a functional perspec-
tive is what defines the very organisational process, e.g. from a design point of view 
(Mintzberg, 1979, 1983), planning in a phenomenological perspective is merely a way 
in which the organisational actors orient themselves and employ umbrella concepts in 
order to make some sense of what is happening (Weick, 1979, Mintzberg, 1994). 
Similarly, leadership in order to create common understanding is important in both 
cases, but while the functional perspective focuses on organisational action directed by 
management, the phenomenological perspective focuses on organisational action fa-
cilitated by management. 
Thus, organisational action is conceived, planned and directed in the first case and 
anticipated, experienced and facilitated in the second case. 
 
 
The variety of strategy concepts 
 
Now, the distinction between two main approaches to strategy is, of course, a dichot-
omy only in a very general sense, since some of the scholars mentioned are difficult to 
place in one camp only and since combinations of the two views are continuously be-
ing discussed (e.g. Stacey, 2003, Wittington, 2001, Cummings, 2002, Balogun & 
Hailey, 2004). One may argue that from a theoretical point of view it ought to be im-
possible to combine two grand paradigms. It is, of course, true that when you con-
struct models, whichever mathematical, conceptual or mental, you need to be very 
much aware of what are the basic assumptions of the mechanisms and relationships 
within the model since some types of assumptions and mechanisms exclude other 
types of assumptions and mechanisms. However, when dealing with applied science a 
clear-cut distinction between grand paradigms may become less obvious because ap-
plied science bridges what can be theoretically conceived and what can be practically 
put to use. While it may seem sensible to conduct an analysis of a problem and device 
a solution to that problem based on formal analysis, it may also seem sensible to take 
into account that the analysis, the problem itself and the solution are influenced by 
what people think and experience (e.g. Weick, 1979, Mintzberg, 1994). Thus, when 
dealing with applied science we are often confronted with problems of analysis that 
make it appropriate to combine paradigms. 
 The status as applied science is only one explanation of why a single-paradigm 
business administration analysis of strategy has not appeared. Another, probably paral-
lel, explanation is that the theory of strategy is so recent a phenomenon in social sci-
ence that a type of normal science in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1962) has not ap-
peared. According to Kuhn, a normal science is characterised by two main mecha-
nisms, i.e. its ability to explain anomalies, and its ability to integrate people into or ex-
clude them from the scientific community. However, these mechanisms may be less 
important in the field of business administration since a variety of different lines of 
thought and analysis appear to exist, both within each part of the grand dichotomy and 
when the dichotomy is parted with and the general lines of thought become mixed. 
Actually, Mintzberg and associates (Mintzberg et al., 1998, Mintzberg & Lampel, 
1999) describe no less than ten different strategy schools of which three are prescrip-
tive and five descriptive while two entail both prescriptive and descriptive elements. 
Furthermore, they argue that several recent developments are eclectic and operate 
across the schools. In effect, they arrive at perhaps fifteen different schools (cf. figure 
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1). In their point of view, the schools represent different stages or focuses of the strat-
egy process, and although they may be mutually exclusive in some circumstances they 
still complement each other when considered from the point of view of the strategy as 
a process or a variety of phenomena where strategy takes different forms whether the 
external world is comprehensible and controllable or unpredictable and confusing, and 
whether the internal strategy process can be described from a rational or natural per-
spective. 
Mintzberg and associates conclude that we need to ask more questions and pay more 
attention to practice and less attention to refining theory and proposing hypotheses. It 
appears that their basic point of view is that we know too little about what is going on 
in firms and have been too occupied with developing solutions to problems that we 
have not fully discovered yet. Kuhn (1962) would have found this argument in line 
with what he says about the development of a normal science. He argues that initially 
a variety of different approaches develop as researchers encounter phenomena which 
they describe in different ways. Gradually, competing preparadigmatic schools appear 
and the competition results in the establishment of a dominating paradigm – dominat-
ing, partly because it appears to be able to explain phenomena more satisfactorily than 
other paradigms, partly because it is able to attract the next generation of researchers. 
However, what can be inferred from Mintzberg and associates, and a variety of other 
researchers for that matter, is that the Kuhnian gradual development may not happen 
in the field of strategy, for two reasons. First, strategy as a scientific discipline is inti-
mately connected to consultancy practice and thus different new ideas and principles 
seem to appear on a regular basis, perhaps even in a cyclical fashion. Second, the logic 
of the field in question may not adhere to the logic of the evolution-revolution se-
quence described by Kuhn. Dealing with strategy means dealing with organisational 
action, and since organisations is populated by people organisational action is con-
tinuously influenced by macro-social changes. So, the phenomena to be studied 
change continuously as “the times they are a-changin´”. 
How exciting! It requires that we keep an open mind and never cease to explore the 
opportunities in contradicting and combining paradigms and schools of thought. And 
it requires that we take the advice of Mintzberg and associates and pay more attention 
to the practices that we are supposed to be able to explain in theoretical terms. The 
next section is devoted to observations from practice while the concluding section ar-
gues that these observations suggest that we meet the Mintzberg-challenge with a gen-
eral dialectical approach. 
 
 
The everyday life of strategy 
 
In order to explore the role that strategy plays in the everyday life of the firm, manag-
ers from six Danish firms were invited to share their thoughts and experiences with a 
group of researchers at the Department of Business Studies at Aalborg University. The 
choice of managers was conscious, i.e. based on the researchers’ impression that the 
managers in question were able to reflect on their daily practice and interested in dis-
cussing their reflections in a scholarly setting. The discussions took place at a series of 
seminars where researchers presented ideas and theories while the managers presented 
their ex post cognition on what their firms had been doing so far. The process was 
complemented by interviews at each firm where the managers had the opportunity to 
elaborate at length on what they had presented at the seminars.1 The following discus-
                                                 
1 The seminars were organised by the FIRM group at the Department of Business 
Studies, Aalborg Universiy, see www.firm.aau.dk. Rasmussen (2005a, 2005b) docu-
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sion is based on three of the six cases. However, the features that are described in the 
following are to a large extent common to all of the six cases. 
 The three companies are all medium-sized firms and have been established a couple 
of decades ago. The group of firms comprises a full-service marketing firm mostly op-
erating on a regional basis, a producer of electronic industrial machinery that operates 
on a world basis, and a producer of office furniture that has some export mainly ori-
ented towards the North-Western European markets.1 Although their history, circum-
stances and abilities differ they do share some features that are worth noticing while 
considering the Mintzberg-challenge. 
 It appears that the firms pursue strategy both formally and informally. Strategy is 
frequently considered and reconsidered as part of a deliberate, structured and planned 
process that results in explicit visions and specific ways to realise the visions. The 
formal statements give direction for future actions and signalise to some extent proac-
tive behaviour. However, at the same time the formal statements are the result of de-
liberation that is mostly a retrospective sense-making of what has been going on. So, 
creating the formal statements is a way of making sense of the past and the future at 
the same time. Sense-making of the present seems to fall outside the scope of the 
process, primarily because the formal statements (quite naturally) leave a lot of room 
for manoeuvring since it is hard to anticipate formally what will be going on in the 
everyday life of the firm. In consequence, the present is guided by the informal every-
day life processes where the organisational actions depend on implicit understandings 
and tacit knowledge shared by the organisation members, the ability to solve occurring 
problems incrementally, and the willingness to reorient oneself as new events appear. 
 The managers experience that their scope of attention is stressed by an intensive 
competition among different problems and solutions that seem to pop up all the time. 
They live in a world of ambiguity where their scope of attention becomes occupied 
with incremental problems of the present for which they have to invent new ways of 
coping. To some extent they themselves limit their scope of attention by getting ideas 
for how to improve organisational actions which they want to test real-life. In a sense, 
the world they describe is like the well-known ambiguous garbage-can world (March 
& Olsen, 1976) combined with the daily muddling-through of organisations (Lind-
blom, 1958) where reflection-in-action (Schön, 1983) seems to be the basic principle. 
In the medium-term, it appears that they are continuously switching between decision 
modes such as the modes of routine, incremental, fundamental, and emergent deci-
sions described by Lindquist (1988). In this situation, the managers have to balance 
between being absorbed of the situation at hand and the overall guidelines provided by 
the formalised strategy framework. 
 Organisational reorientation that leads to organisational action is very often stimu-
lated by a sense of crisis, i.e. the feeling among managers that the extra-organisational 
task environment is changing, rapidly and unpredictable. This is not a phenomenon 
unique to the firms in question, but a phenomenon that is being described frequently in 
contributions on strategy (e.g. Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, Thompson, 2001). The 
sense of crisis leads to two things. 
 First, the managers try to interpret what is going on and attempt to decide on some 
organisational action by which the organisation can cope or even exploit the changes 
in the extra-organisational task environment. By constructing organisational actions 
they actually construct the extra-organisational task environment at the same time, be-
cause even though the environment may be “out there” the managers have to create a 
                                                                                                                                 
ments the cases referred to in the following, however in Danish. The case studies are 
part of a combined case study and theoretical study of strategy making, the so-called 
Stracon project (STRAtegy and CONtext). 
1 A brief case story on each firm appears in Annex 1. 
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subset of the great variety of non-complete internal and external information on which 
to form an opinion and make decisions1. 
 Second, the interviews reveal that the solutions that the managers come up with are 
frequently opposed by some organisation members (sometimes even from other man-
agers) for several reasons such as individual fear of what the change may bring about, 
organisational inertia, and conflict between existing positive feedback mechanisms 
and the signals send by the changes proposed. While the managers have to propose 
and pursue changes, they also have to take into account that resistance occurs and that 
resistance may be a positive experience. Individual insecurity often reflects the need to 
align the changes with the history of the firm, the emotional processes involved in 
changes, and the ways in which the employees can become stakeholders in the process 
of change (Balogun & Hailey, 2004), and thus resistance points to an opportunity for 
making the new solutions a more integrated part of the organisational life. Inertia, as 
explained by Witt & Meyer (1998), does not only reflect that changes take time, but is 
actually an opportunity for taking into account that parts of the existing organisational 
actions are quite efficient and successful. The main point is that if changes are too eas-
ily accepted, the efficiency of the everyday life of the firm is continuously endangered 
(Rasmussen, 2005c: 21). Finally, the fact that changes may unintentionally hamper the 
existing positive feedback loops in the firm (Argyris, 1996, Stacey, 2003) is an oppor-
tunity for reconsidering the existing feedback loops and considering which (and 
whether) new ones are to be developed. 
 Summing up on the case studies, what the managers experience is that they are si-
multaneously engaging in formal and informal processes, the creation of explicit 
knowledge and the execution of tacit knowledge, planning the future and reflecting-in-
action, creating the future by discovering the past and mastering the present by making 
sense, defining major changes and solving problems incrementally, implementing de-
cisions and implementing themselves. The managers live in a world of transpositions 
characterised by dialectical relationships where syntheses result in new dialectical 
situations. 
 In consequence, a sensible way to meet the Mintzberg-challenge is, apparently, to 
focus on transpositions in a dialectical setting. 
 
 
Strategy as a dialectical process 
 
Our case studies indicate that strategy processes are not a linear chain of event. In-
stead, strategy processes appear as irregular spirals that actually in many cases func-
tion very well and lead to a successful chain of actions that generate products and in-
come to the firm. 
 Even though the firms in our case studies are far from being ideals they have, never-
theless, managed to do more than exist, i.e. to expand and change their products, or-
ganisation and competencies so they continuously have matched dramatic changes at 
the market place and encountered innovation in technology and knowledge. They have 
transformed remarkably during their life-time by changing from producers of inexpen-
sive products to a kind of bulk market to sellers of high quality and advanced products 
at niche markets. The transformation is associated with substantial changes of the pro-
duction and product development functions of the firms, especially in the cases of the 
furniture and the electronic firm where production has become highly automated and 
partly outsourced while more attention and resources have been devoted to product 
                                                 
1 This is actually in accordance with frequent descriptions in strategy books, e.g. 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) and Cummings (2002). 
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and process development.1 This development have made the firms able to operate on 
markets that are increasingly global, proving that it is possible to master international 
competition even though they use a labour force that is well paid, and as firms are 
working according to the standards of a modern welfare society where costs of pro-
duction are substantial. 
 The basic dialectical opposition that characterises the strategy processes going on in 
the firms we have studied is the interplay between deliberate and emergent strategy. 
On the one hand, strategy-making is an organised activity with clearly defined mile-
stones and time sequences associated with regular meetings. On the other hand, strat-
egy making is also the outcome of the solving of problems when managers suddenly 
discover or sense a problem that they anticipate will lead to strategic difficulties, and 
where the solutions subsequently are applied to correct the formally defined strategy. 
In the case of the marketing firm this happened so often and impacted so strongly that 
it eventually caused a complete reformulation of the entire formal strategy procedure. 
In the case of the furniture firm, the continuous changes of the formal strategy process 
have occurred throughout the entire history of the firm and have by now become an 
important part of how the managers perceive the identity of the firm. In the case of the 
electronic firm, formal strategy processes have frequently been put on stand-by while 
emergent strategies were allowed to evolve. 
 The interplay between deliberate and emergent strategy reflects that there is a ten-
sion between on the one hand the rational management effort to define and pursue a 
clearly and linearly defined strategy and on the other hand the naturally occurring 
every day life events that create new directions of the firm. The success of the firms 
that we have studied can partly be explained by the fact that the managers of the firm 
understand and respect this tension in the sense that they emphasise the necessity of 
tuning the entire organisation to strategic change when needed. This means that the ra-
tional decisions on how to conduct the strategy process take, as their point of depar-
ture, what the natural organisation is able to understand and cope with. By doing so, 
the organisation tries to avoid  the “talk versus action” type of organisation described 
by e.g. Brunsson (1985) and is more likely to arrive at a position where productive or-
ganisational actions can take place. 
 A striking example of this is how the firms in questions relate to their environment. 
A frequently applied rational line of strategy is to analyse the environment in terms of 
markets, competitors, suppliers etcetera in order to form an accurate picture on oppor-
tunities and threats. An exercise like this actually takes place on a regular basis. How-
ever, at the same time an important activity within the three firms is to arrive at a mu-
tual agreement, primarily within the management group, on how the “world around 
us” ought to been seen. As one of the managers we interviewed put it, an agreed image 
of the market rather than an accurate picture is often more important to competitive-
ness because it is the agreed image that leads to organisational action. 
 The importance of having an agreed image might be seen as an example of bounded 
rationality where managers have to act in conditions of imperfect information and 
managerial focus of attention is a scarce resource. However, this is only part of the 
story. To an important extent, the managers create conditions of limited rationality 
themselves by deliberately defining some possibilities as not being part of the manage-
rial agenda.2 Thus, limited rationality is associated with an enactment process where 
the world in which to operate is socially constructed and becomes objectified within 
the management group. While objectification occurs as part of the history of the firm 
                                                 
1 A similar change is taking place in the marketing firm at the moment. 
2 For instance, further outsourcing, closing down production lines and some types of 
reorganisations are not part of the normal agenda for strategic decisions in the firms in 
question. 
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without the managers necessarily being aware of the process going on, our interviews 
reveal that the creation and use of mutually agreed images are also the outcome of de-
liberate choices made by management in order to avoid unproductive and unpredict-
able organisational tension. Our interviewees express that “too much rationality” 
would damage the daily operations of the firm, and that the introduction of certain 
strategic themes would disrupt the management group, so consequently they strive for 
a mutually agreed image of the world and the situation of the firm. However, this does 
not imply that action-preventing consensus is the outcome of the process. Rather, in 
the firms in question it implies that a set of action-generating images of challenges is 
created. An extreme example of action-generation occurs in the furniture firm where 
the management group by assistance of external consultancy a couple of times have 
assessed themselves, defined new functions in relation to how they think the future 
should be met, and have radically changed positions among the individual managers 
accordingly in order to pursue a new strategic agenda. A process like this which re-
quires a considerable amount of mutual trust and an outstanding willingness to operate 
as team members is a powerful example of the capability of mutually created images 
to create action and change. 
 The firms in question are continuously being challenged by new and increasingly 
skilled competitors at a market place where changes in products, technology, knowl-
edge, and sales and marketing methods are frequent. The firms have been able to meet 
the challenges because they have productively exploited the contradiction between on 
the one hand structured decision-making and implementation processes and on the 
other hand creative norm-breaking decisions that have made the firms competitive on 
the edge of technology and knowledge. However, in order to do so the managers have  
sometime had to push rather strongly new ideas that were not easily accepted by other 
managers or by the organisation because it was not clear how the ideas related to the 
everyday understanding within the firm. In some situations, the managers ceased to 
push and resorted to well-known solutions that had worked successfully before. To 
some extent, this might not form a severe problem since organisational inertia fre-
quently is a healthy sign of the fact that it is not productive to change processes that 
solve the problems they are supposed to solve and create the solutions necessary to do 
so. It signifies that norm-breaking ideas often have the best chance in conditions of 
crisis, i.e. where it becomes clear to everyone that the existing solutions do not solve 
the problems occurring – which is actually a problem because situations of crisis sel-
dom create psychological conditions favourable to change. In all of the firms in ques-
tion, the managers were aware of the dialectical relationship between the needs and 
the constraints of new creative ideas and the concurrent organisational tensions. 
 During the life-span of the firms in question, as long as the managers can remember 
or have been told about the previous history of the firm, the formation of strategy and 
especially the substantial strategic changes that have happened, strategy can in retro-
spect be explained in a rather linear way. But at the same time this linear retrospection 
can be formulated in the well-known Kirkegaard words: “Life can only be understood 
backward, but must be lived forward”. In a strategic context this means that we have to 
explain by a formal discourse what in the live situation for the mangers very often are 
experienced as decisions and actions of a muddling through nature or in some situa-
tions crisis-responding decisions made rather abruptly.  
 In conclusion, we find that our case analysis shows that studying real-life strategy is 
highly facilitated if the researcher is open to combining perspectives and paradigms, 
and is keen on looking for dialectical relationships between opportunities and con-
straints, what people do and what they think, what is rationally conceived and planned 
and what occurs naturally. The cases presented above could hardly be understood 
without a general dialectical and pragmatic approach. By using a general dialectical 
and pragmatic approach, the incompatibility between different schools and paradigms 
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becomes less obvious, and the existence of different schools and paradigms enrich the 
analysis rather than create confusion and obscurity. This point to the importance of 
developing a more broad eclectic approach, and to the extent that it may become 
meaningful to talk about a normal science in strategy analysis – albeit not in the 
Kuhnian sense as argued previously – it would be “normal” in the sense that the scien-
tific community mutually agrees on paradigmatic and disciplinary combinations look-
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Figure 1. Schools of strategy, supplementing one another and creating combinations 
Source: Adapted from Mintzberg & Lampel (1999) 
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Annex 1 
 
THE MARKETING FIRM 
The firm was established some twenty years ago. Over the years, it has taken over a 
number of smaller marketing firms in the region and is today the largest supplier of 
such services situated in the region. It has developed from a firm that delivered all 
kinds of marketing services to all payable customers to focus on the larger customers 
in and outside the region and given up servicing the smaller customers. It is now in a 
process of defining a number of key services that will create a more clear profile of the 
firm and use some of those specific competencies that are currently being developed. 
The management has abandoned a yearly procedure for strategic work that was de-
signed a couple of years ago, because it was not used and nobody seemed to care. A 
new procedure is currently being developed. The process involves all the managers 
and one forth of the employees. It aims at a structure more suited for this particular 
firm with its focus, its employees and its culture and technology. 
 
THE ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY FIRM 
The firm is some thirty years old and was founded on an idea for a completely new 
product for many industrial processes that was much smaller, had a larger capacity and 
was more flexible. The product became a success worldwide and during the years a 
portfolio of product variants has consistently been developed at the technical forefront 
of the field. All the time less advanced firms have tried to compete with less sophisti-
cated but cheaper products and recently this kind of competition has increased and 
new competitors are continuously entering the market. In response the firm has in-
creased automation of production, outsourced to Chinese firms and developed a focus 
on capacity to develop, to control quality and to sell. Presently, the management is 
asking itself whether the firm should carry on the technology trajectory that has al-
ways been of strategic importance, compete more aggressively on prices by using its 
competencies in cost minimisation, or concentrate on reorganising its channels of mar-
keting and sales. 
 
THE OFFICE FURNITURE FIRM 
The firm has existed for several decades and was originally started on an idea of sell-
ing cheap office furniture to the Danish marked through retail shops. Gradually the 
products of the firm increased in quality and the channels of sales became specialised. 
In this process the firm has overtaken first a number of other Danish producers and 
later on producers in the neighbouring countries, focusing on market control and qual-
ity improvement. The firm has been through some ups and downs and has a couple of 
time been pretty near to bankruptcy. 9/11 impacted the industry and what was left of 
retail sales disappeared and newer came back. The firm managed because of its ability 
to change its product program and continue automation. Furthermore, the management 
group proved highly flexible and nearly everybody changed functions to meet the new 
situation. The firm recovered and even took over some of its competitors. By now, it 
does not seem likely to gain by further automation, and in order to be competitive fo-
cus has to be shifted from selling furniture to selling systems with high quality in de-
sign and ergonomics.  
 
The supplementary cases are, in brief, the following. 
 
THE PROCESS AND MATERIAL TECHNOLOGY FIRM 
The firm was established five years ago as a spin-off in order to exploit a number of 
technologies developed in a large Danish concern. It is highly export oriented and sells 
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to a number of very large global firms. The firm has been growing rapidly and is at the 
moment leaving the pioneer phase and entering a more steady growth stage. 
 
THE BUILDING MATERIAL FIRM 
The firm is fifteen years old and was started as a spin-off in order to exploit a product 
idea developed in a large Danish firm. It is an export oriented firm and the sole pro-
ducer of this kind of product. The turn over is quite stable and the firm has during the 
last couple of years been occupied with changing its organizational structure by using 
lean principles. 
 
THE CONSULTING FIRM 
The firm is small and less than five years old. It specializes in application of business 
ICT solutions. It operates as a network partner together with a number of other firms 
who together supplement each other. The main fields are consulting, teaching and 
training, and ICT development projects. 
 
 
 
